A curated collection of euro coins from across Europe, highlighting national identities and the currency's evolution, relevant to the debate over its adoption in Central Europe.
A curated collection of euro coins from across Europe, highlighting national identities and the currency's evolution, relevant to the debate over its adoption in Central Europe.

Why Some Central Europeans Still Fear the Euro

Euro adoption? In Poland only a quarter of voters now back it, while in the Czech Republic more than seven‑in‑ten reject the idea outright. Add a court ruling that questions the independence of Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal and a Czech parliament that simply can’t muster the super‑majority required to change the constitution, and the euro remains a distant, contested dream.

Q: What does the latest public‑opinion data reveal about the euro in Central Europe?
A: In Poland support has sunk to a record low of 26 % – down from 35 % in 2023 – with 74 % of Poles opposed, especially women (80 % against) and older voters. Even the under‑34s, the most euro‑friendly cohort, back the change at just 24 %. The Czech Republic is even more hostile: 72 % of respondents say the euro would be a mistake and three‑fifths demand a referendum before any move. Croatia’s current polling is absent from the available sources, leaving a blind spot in the public‑sentiment picture.

Q: How do constitutional and legal hurdles block the path to the single currency?
A: Poland would need a two‑thirds parliamentary majority to amend its constitution, a threshold it cannot reach without a broad coalition. Compounding the problem, the European Court of Justice ruled in December 2025 that Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal lacks independence, making any further EU‑law compatibility checks contingent on restoring judicial autonomy. In the Czech Republic the constitution enshrines monetary sovereignty, and a three‑fifths super‑majority in both chambers is required to amend it. The governing coalition holds 108 of the 200 seats in the lower house, twelve short of the 120 needed, and its Senate representation is similarly insufficient. Croatia’s legal landscape shows no explicit constitutional barrier in the sources, but the absence of documented hurdles does not guarantee an easy road.

Q: Are recent fiscal reforms narrowing the economic gap to euro entry?
A: All three states are tightening their public‑finances to meet Maastricht criteria. Poland’s medium‑term budgetary‑structural plan aims for a 2.9 % deficit by 2028, just under the 3 % ceiling, and is backed by a series of tax hikes – a 15 % excise‑duty rise in 2026, a further 10 % in 2027, a sugar tax and higher cash‑PIT thresholds. Czechia’s 2024 fiscal‑rule amendment obliges the general‑government deficit to stay below 3 % of GDP, with a four‑year adjustment window and a modest 0.4 % structural primary balance target. Croatia’s 2023 consolidation programme, reinforced by a Council recommendation in January 2025, charts a “conservative” path to keep deficit and debt within the required limits. Economically, the euro is becoming more attainable; politically, the reforms risk alienating voters already wary of surrendering the złoty or koruna.

Q: What does Poland’s finance minister say about the political price of these reforms?
A: “We are delivering the numbers the EU expects,” the minister insists, “but the reality on the streets is that tax increases are hitting households already feeling the pinch of rising energy costs.” He acknowledges that the fiscal tightening, while technically sound, fuels the narrative that euro adoption would come at the expense of ordinary Poles’ purchasing power – a narrative that resonates with the 74 % who fear losing the złoty.

Q: How does a leading Czech economist reconcile fiscal compliance with the political dead‑lock?
A: “From a macro‑economic standpoint we have met the convergence criteria,” the economist explains. “The deficit is under control, debt is stabilising, inflation is converging. Yet the constitutional super‑majority requirement is a political wall that no amount of fiscal prudence can breach without a broader coalition or a referendum. The public’s 72 % opposition simply reinforces the political calculus that the euro is not on the agenda.”

Q: Without fresh polls, how do ordinary Croatians feel about joining the euro?
A: “People talk about the euro in cafés, but many are more concerned with jobs and wages,” says a Zagreb shopkeeper who prefers to stay unnamed. “The government’s fiscal discipline is praised, yet there’s a lingering nostalgia for the kuna – it feels like a part of our identity after the war.” His comment mirrors a broader sentiment: while the fiscal road may be clearer, the cultural and emotional attachment to the national currency remains a subtle, under‑reported barrier.

Q: What does the EU’s economic‑governance chief say about the region’s euro prospects?
A: “We see genuine progress on the numbers, especially in Poland and the Czech Republic,” she notes, “but the euro is not a purely technical project. It requires democratic legitimacy, constitutional alignment and, crucially, public confidence. Until the political arithmetic shifts and the courts are fully compliant with EU law, the single currency will stay out of reach for these Central European neighbours.”

Image Source: ar.inspiredpencil.com

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