The EU has openly demanded that Tehran free imprisoned journalist Narges Mohammadíová, turning a single case into a litmus test for European human‑rights diplomacy. The call, delivered in the dead of winter, links her fragile health and the right to free expression to a broader set of demands that could reshape how the bloc engages with Iran. It is the most publicised European appeal since the Union’s rights‑linked sanctions on Iran’s judiciary in April 2025.
On 13 December 2025 the European External Action Service, via spokesperson Anouar El Anouni, issued a stark statement urging Iranian authorities to release Mohammadíová and to free all those “unjustly arrested in the exercise of their freedom of expression”. The EEAS appeal paired a humanitarian plea with a clear political message: the EU will not tolerate the systematic suppression of dissent.
Three days earlier, the European Parliament staged a high‑profile human‑rights conference in Brussels to mark the 77th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The event provided a platform for a broader set of conditions, with Maryam Rajavi, president‑elect of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, demanding that any future EU‑Iran dialogue be contingent on a halt to executions, the closure of Iranian diplomatic posts used for espionage, and the terrorist designation of the IRGC and the Ministry of Intelligence. The conference cited Iran’s record of 1 932 executions in 2025 – an average of eleven per day – as evidence of “state‑sanctioned murder on an industrial scale”.
Despite the high‑visibility statements, no further EU instrument – be it a Council communiqué, a formal resolution, or a legal note – has been located in the public record. Attempts to retrieve such documents from official EU portals have returned errors, leaving the EEAS appeal and the parliamentary framing as the sole formal levers currently deployed. This reliance on political signalling rather than codified measures underscores the tentative nature of the Union’s pressure.
The demand sits squarely within a growing rights‑linked toolbox the EU has been sharpening since April 2025, when sanctions targeted judges and prosecutors implicated in the persecution of Baha’is. That precedent proved the bloc can translate human‑rights concerns into enforceable economic and legal actions. By tying Mohammadíová’s release to systemic reforms – ending mass executions, shuttering intelligence‑linked embassies, and branding key security organs as terrorist – the EU is testing whether similar pressure can be institutionalised across the broader EU‑Iran agenda, potentially making civil‑rights compliance a prerequisite for any future nuclear or trade negotiations.
Iran’s possible responses range from outright dismissal to calculated retaliation. Tehran could portray the EU’s demands as external interference, especially the call to label the IRGC and MOIS as terrorist, prompting a diplomatic protest or a reciprocal tightening of its own sanctions on European interests. Alternatively, Iran might use the situation to rally domestic support, casting Mohammadíová as a martyr of foreign aggression while quietly tightening internal controls. The lack of a binding EU resolution, however, limits the Union’s leverage; without a legal framework to enforce consequences, the pressure may remain symbolic unless the EU escalates to broader measures such as asset freezes or diplomatic expulsions.
If the EU chooses to formalise the conditions set out in Brussels – embedding them in a revised Human‑Rights Dialogue or attaching them to trade‑policy reviews – the case of Narges Mohammadíová could become a watershed moment. It would signal a shift from ad‑hoc condemnations to a structured, rights‑conditioned foreign‑policy approach, compelling Tehran to reckon with a Europe that is prepared to link strategic cooperation to concrete human‑rights outcomes. The effectiveness of this emerging blueprint will hinge on the Union’s ability to move from political rhetoric to enforceable action, and on whether Tehran perceives the cost of non‑compliance as outweighing the diplomatic fallout.
